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We provide a general formalism to characterize the cryptographic properties of quantum channels
in the realistic scenario where the two honest parties employ prepare and measure protocols and
the known two-way communication reconciliation techniques. We obtain a necessary and sufficient
condition to distill a secret key using this type of schemes for Pauli qubit channels and generalized
Pauli channels in higher dimension. Our results can be applied to standard protocols such as BB84 or
six-state, giving a critical error rate of 20% and 27.6%, respectively. We explore several possibilities
to enlarge these bounds, without any improvement. These results suggest that there may exist
weakly entangling channels useless for key distribution using prepare and measure schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Cryptography, that is, Quantum Key Dis-
tribution (QKD) followed by one-time pad, is one of the
most important quantum information applications. The
existing cryptographic methods using classical resources
base their security on technical assumptions on the eaves-
dropper, often called Eve, capabilities, such as finite com-
putational power or bounded memory [1]. Contrary to
all these schemes, the security proofs of QKD protocols,
e.g. the BB84 protocol [2], do not rely on any assumption
on Eve’s power: they are simply based on the fact that
Eve’s, as well as the honest parties’ devices are governed
by quantum theory [3]. Thus, well-established quantum
features, such as the monogamy of quantum correlations
(entanglement) or the impossibility of perfect cloning [4],
make QKD secure. Actually, any possible quantum at-
tack by Eve would introduce errors and modify the ex-
pected quantum correlations between the honest parties,
Alice and Bob. The amount of these errors can be esti-
mated using public discussion, so the honest parties can
judge whether their quantum channel can be used for se-
cure QKD, or abort the insecure transmission otherwise.
The monogamy of entangled quantum states (see [5])
can be simply illustrated in the scenario where two dis-
tant parties know to share a two-qubit maximally entan-
gled state, the so-called ebit,
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). (1)
Since the state is pure, it cannot be correlated with a
third eavesdropping party. So, Alice and Bob can safely
map their ebit into a secret bit by just measuring in the
computational bases (see, Fig. (1)). It is meant by se-
cret bit a random bit shared by Alice and Bob that is
uncorrelated to Eve, namely P (A,B,E) = P (A,B)P (E)
and P (A = 0, B = 0) = P (A = 1, B = 1) = 1/2, where
P (A,B,E) denotes the probability distribution describ-
ing Alice, Bob and Eve’s correlations. Then, a simple
QKD protocol could consist of Alice locally preparing a
state |Φ+〉, sending half of this state through the channel
to Bob, and then measuring in the computational bases.
However, any realistic channel between Alice and Bob is
in general noisy, so the state sent by Alice interacts with
the environment and is transformed into a mixed state,
ρAB. As a consequence of the noisy interaction with the
environment, Alice and Bob measurement outcomes are
no longer perfectly correlated. The honest parties then
should know how to deal with errors. They should safely
assume that Eve has the power to control all the envi-
ronment, so all the errors are due to her interaction with
the sent states: the larger the observed error rate, the
larger Eve’s information.
Entanglement distillation protocols [6] offer a possible
solution to the problem of errors or decoherence in the
quantum channel. It is a technique that allows two sep-
arate parties to transform by local operations and clas-
sical communication (LOCC) many copies of a known
entangled mixed state into a fewer number of pure ebits.
These ebits can later be consumed to establish secret
bits. However, entanglement distillation protocols are by
far not feasible with present-day technology. This is be-
cause they require the use of a quantum memory, a device
able to store quantum states, and controlled coherent op-
erations. Both techniques turn out to be experimentally
very challenging.
However, in order to establish secret bits, Alice and
Bob do not necessarily have to go through entanglement
distillation. A much more feasible family of protocols
consist of the honest parties measuring their quantum
states at the single-copy level and then applying classical
distillation techniques to the obtained measurement out-
comes. We denote these SIngle-copy Measurements plus
ClAssical Processing protocols as SIMCAP [8]. Actually,
it is well known that in the case of SIMCAP protocols,
the honest parties do not have to use entanglement at all
for the correlation distribution [9]. Indeed, Alice’s prepa-
ration of the entangled two-qubit state plus measurement
can be replaced by the preparation of a one-qubit state
that is sent trough the noisy channel to Bob, who later
measures it. That is, any SIMCAP protocol in the en-
tanglement picture is equivalent to a prepare and measure
scheme [9], which is much more feasible from an applied
point of view. The BB84 and the six-state [10] protocols
constitute known examples of prepare and measure QKD
schemes.
Independently of the type of measurements or distilla-
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FIG. 1: Schematic diagram for key distillation from quantum
states: a secret key can be distilled either by entanglement dis-
tillation plus measurement, which is an experimentally chal-
lenging process, or by measurement plus classical processing
of the outcomes, whose implementation is much more feasible.
tion techniques employed in the protocol, a first and cru-
cial step in any QKD scheme consists of a tomographic
process by Alice and Bob to obtain information about
their connecting quantum channel. By means of this pro-
cess, Alice and Bob should conclude whether the secrecy
properties of their channel are sufficient to run a QKD
protocol. In the standard formulation, the cryptographic
properties of quantum channels are referred to a specific
protocol. For instance, a standard problem is to deter-
mine the critical quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the
channel such that key distillation is possible using one- or
two-way distillation techniques using the BB84 protocol.
However, it appears meaningful to identify and quantify
the cryptographic properties of a quantum channel by it-
self, independently of any pre-determined QKD protocol.
Indeed, this is closer to what happens in reality, where
the channel connecting Alice and Bob is fixed. There-
fore, after the tomographic process, the two honest par-
ties should design the protocol which is better tailored
to the estimated channel parameters. In this sense, it is
well known that no secure QKD can be established using
entanglement-breaking channel [11, 12], while the detec-
tion of entanglement already guarantees the presence of
some form of secrecy [13]. Beyond these two results, lit-
tle is known about which channel properties are necessary
and/or sufficient for secure QKD.
In the present work, we analyze the cryptographic
properties of quantum channels when Alice and Bob em-
ploy QKD schemes where (i) the correlation distribution
is done using prepare and measure techniques and (ii) the
key distillation process uses the standard one-way and
two-way classical protocols. Indeed, these are the tech-
niques presently used in any realistic QKD implementa-
tion. It should be clear, then, that none of the protocols
considered here require the use of entangled particles.
However, for the sake of simplicity, we perform our anal-
ysis in the completely equivalent entanglement picture.
As it becomes clearer below, the problem then consists
of identifying those quantum states that can be distilled
into secret bits by SIMCAP protocols restricted to the
known distillation techniques. A first step in this direc-
tion has recently been given in [14]. There, a rather easily
computable and powerful necessary condition for secure
QKD is derived, which is shown to be sufficient against
the so-called collective attacks (see below). In general,
the derived necessary condition is more restrictive than
the entanglement condition. In this work, we first red-
erive the security condition of [14], improving the security
analysis. Since collective attacks have been proven to be
as powerful as general attacks [15], our condition actually
applies to any attack. We show how to apply this condi-
tion to the standard BB84 and six-state protocols. Next,
we explore several possibilities to improve the obtained
security bounds. Remarkably, all these alternatives fail,
which suggests the existence of non-distillable entangled
states under general SIMCAP protocols. Then, we move
to higher dimensional systems, also called qudits, and ex-
tend the results to generalized Bell diagonal qudit chan-
nels. The obtained security condition turns out to be
tight for the so-called (d + 1)- and 2-bases protocol of
Ref. [16].
The article is organized as follows. Section II defines
what we call realistic protocols. In section III, we in-
troduce and classify several eavesdropping attacks. Ex-
ploiting the connection between QKD and the de Finetti
theorem established by Renner [15], we can restrict the
security analysis to the so-called collective attacks, where
Eve applies the same interaction to each quantum state.
Then, we briefly review some of the existing security
bounds for the two most commonly used prepare and
measure protocols, BB84 and six-state (section IIID). In
the next section, we derive the announced security condi-
tion for qubit channels and apply it to the two mentioned
protocols. We then show that neither pre-processing nor
coherent quantum operations by one of the parties im-
proves the obtained security bounds. In section VII, we
move to higher dimensional systems, extending the se-
curity conditions to generalized Bell diagonal channels.
Then, we apply this condition to the (d+1)- and 2-bases
protocols of [16], which can be understood as the natu-
ral generalization to qudits of the BB84 and the six-state
protocols, and prove the tightness for these protocols. Fi-
nally, section IX summarizes the main results and open
questions discussed in this work. Most of the technical
details are left for the appendices.
II. REALISTIC PROTOCOL
There exist plenty of QKD protocols in the literature.
Here, we restrict our considerations to what we call real-
istic protocols where Alice prepares and sends states from
a chosen basis to Bob, who measures in another (possi-
bly different) basis. This establishes some classical cor-
relations between the two honest parties. Of course this
process alone is clearly insecure, since Eve could apply
an intercept resend strategy in the same basis as Alice’s
state preparation, acquiring the whole information with-
out being detected. Therefore, from time to time, Alice
3and Bob should change their state preparation and mea-
surements to monitor the channel and exclude this possi-
bility. Alice and Bob announce these symbols to extract
information about their channel, so these instances do
not contribute to the final key rate. Indeed these symbols
are waisted in the tomographic process previously men-
tioned. However, in the limit of large sequences, the frac-
tion of cases where Alice and Bob monitor the channel
can be made negligible in comparison with the key length,
but still sufficient to have a faithful description of some
channel parameters, such as the QBER [17]. The states
sent by Alice will be transformed into a mixed state be-
cause of Eve’s interaction. This decoherence will produce
errors in the measurement values obtained by Bob. The
security analysis aims at answering whether the observed
decoherence in the channel is small enough to allow Alice
and Bob distilling a secret key. We call these protocols
realistic in the sense that they do not involve experi-
mentally difficult quantum operations, such as coherent
measurements, quantum memories or the generation of
entangled particles. The establishment of correlations is
done by just generating one-qubit states and measuring
them in two or more bases. Additionally, one could think
of including a filtering single-copy measurement on Bob’s
side. This operation is harder than a standard projective
measurement, but still feasible with present-day technol-
ogy [18].
The above scenario can be explained in the completely
equivalent entanglement-based scenario [9], that turns
out to be much more convenient for the theoretical anal-
ysis. In the entanglement-based scheme, the information
encoding by Alice is replaced by generating and measur-
ing half of a maximally entangled state. That is, Alice
first locally generates a maximally entangled two-qubit
state and sends half of it to Bob through the channel. A
mixed state ρAB is then shared by the two honest parties,
due to the interaction with the environment controlled by
Eve. Now, Alice and Bob measure in two bases to map
their quantum correlations into classical correlations. For
instance, if Alice and Bob measure in the computational
bases, the QBER simply reads
ǫAB = 〈01|ρAB|01〉+ 〈10|ρAB|10〉.
It can be imposed that Alice’s local state cannot be modi-
fied by Eve, since the corresponding particle never leaves
Alice’s lab, which is assumed to be secure. It has to
be clear that the techniques of [9] imply the equivalence
between SIMCAP protocols on entangled states and pre-
pare and measure QKD schemes: the correlation distri-
bution is, from the secrecy point of view, identical. This
equivalence, for instance, is lost if one considers entangle-
ment distillation protocols for QKD, where the particles
are measured by the honest parties after applying coher-
ent quantum operations.
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FIG. 2: A tripartite pure state is prepared by Eve, who send
two of the particles to Alice and Bob and keeps one. From
Alice and Bob viewpoint the situation resembles a standard
noisy channel. The honest parties perform measurements at
the single copy level, possibly with some preliminary filtering
step. Eve keeps her quantum states and can arbitrarily delay
her collective measurement.
A. Classical key distillation
After the correlation distribution, either using prepare
and measure or SIMCAP protocols, Alice and Bob share
partially secret correlations to be distilled into the per-
fect key. The problem of distilling noisy and partially
secret correlations into a secret key has not been com-
pletely solved. Recently, general lower bounds to the
distillable secret-key rate by means of error correction
and privacy amplification using one-way communication
have been obtained in [19]. In case the correlations are
too noisy for the direct use of one-way distillation tech-
niques, Alice and Bob can before apply a protocol using
two-way communication. The obtained correlations after
this two-way process may become distillable using one-
way protocols. Much less is known about key distillation
using two-way communication. Here we mostly apply the
standard two-way communication protocol introduced by
Maurer in [20], also known as classical advantage dis-
tillation (CAD). Actually, we analyze the following two
slightly different CAD protocols:
• CAD1. Alice and Bob share a list of correlated bits.
Alice selects N of her bits that have the same value
and publicly announces the position of these sym-
bols. Bob checks whether his corresponding sym-
bols are also equal. If this is the case, Bob an-
nounces to Alice that he accepts, so they use the
measurement values (they are all the same) as a bit
for the new list. Otherwise, they reject the N val-
ues and start again the process with another block.
• CAD2. Alice locally generates a random bit s. She
takes a block of N of her bits, A, and computes the
vector
X = (X1, · · · , XN ) (2)
such that Ai + Xi = s. She then announces the
4new block X through the public and authenticated
classical channel. After receiving X , Bob adds it
to his corresponding block, B + X , and accepts
whenever all the resulting values are the same. If
not, the symbols are discarded and the process is
started again, as above.
These protocols are equivalent in classical cryptogra-
phy and in the completely general quantum scenario.
Nevertheless, it is shown in section IVC that they are
different in some particular, but still relevant, scenarios.
In what follows, we restrict the analysis to key distillation
protocols consisting of CAD followed by standard one-
way error correction and privacy amplification. Thus, it
is important to keep in mind that any security claim is re-
ferred to this type of key-distillation protocols. Although
these are the protocols commonly used when consider-
ing two-way reconciliation techniques, their optimality,
at least in terms of robustness, has not been proven.
III. EAVESDROPPING STRATEGIES
After describing Alice and Bob’s operations, it is now
time to consider Eve’s attacks. With full generality, we
suppose that Eve has the power to control all the en-
vironment. That is, all the information that leaks out
through the channel connecting Alice and Bob goes to
Eve, so all the decoherence seen by Alice and Bob is intro-
duced by her interaction. Following Ref. [14], eavesdrop-
ping strategies can be classified into three types: (i) in-
dividual, (ii) collective and (iii) coherent. Once more,
although most of the following discussion is presented in
the entanglement picture, the same conclusions apply to
the corresponding prepare and measure scheme.
A. Individual attacks
In an individual attack Eve is assumed to apply the
same interaction to each state, without introducing cor-
relations among copies, and measure her state right af-
ter this interaction. In this type of attacks, all three
parties immediately measure their states, since no one
is supposed to have the ability to store quantum states.
Therefore, they end up sharing classical-classical-classical
(CCC) correlated measurement outcomes [21], described
by a probability distribution P (A,B,E). In this case,
standard results from Classical Information Theory can
be directly applied. For instance, it is well known that
the secret-key rate using one-way communication, K→,
is bounded by so-called Csisza´r-Ko¨rner bound [22],
K→ ≥ I(A : B)− I(A : E). (3)
Here I(A : B) denotes the classical mutual information
between the measurement outcomes A and B. It reads
I(A : B) = H(A)−H(A|B), (4)
where H denotes the standard Shannon entropy. In this
type of attacks, Eve’s interaction can be seen as a sort of
asymmetric cloning [23] producing two different approx-
imate copies, one for Bob and one for her. This cloning
transformation reads UBE : |Φ+〉AB|E〉 → |Ψ〉ABE where
ρAB = trE |Ψ〉〈Ψ|ABE . It has been shown that in the
case of two qubits, two honest parties can distill a secret
key secure against any individual attacks whenever their
quantum state ρAB is entangled [8].
It is clear that to prove security against individual at-
tacks is not satisfactory from a purely theoretical point of
view. However, we believe it is a relevant issue when deal-
ing with realistic eavesdroppers. Assume Eve’s quantum
memory decoherence rate is nonzero and the honest par-
ties are able to estimate it. Then, they can introduce a
delay between the state distribution and the distillation
process long enough to prevent Eve keeping her states
without errors. Eve is then forced to measure her states
before the reconciliation, as for an individual attack.
B. Collective Attacks
Collective attacks represent, in principle, an intermedi-
ate step between individual and the most general attack.
Eve is again assumed to apply the same interaction to
each quantum state, but she has a quantum memory. In
other words, she is not forced to measure her state after
the interaction and can arbitrarily delay her measure-
ment. In particular, she can wait until the end of the
reconciliation process and adapt her measurement to the
public information exchanged by Alice and Bob. After
a collective attack, the two honest parties share N inde-
pendent copies of the same state, ρ⊗NAB , where no correla-
tion exists from copy to copy. Without losing generality,
the full state of the three parties can be taken equal to
|ψ〉⊗NABE , where
|ψ〉ABE = (IA ⊗ UBE)|Φ+〉AB|E〉. (5)
After a collective attack, and the measurements by Al-
ice and Bob, the three parties share classical-classical-
quantum (CCQ) correlations, described by a state∑
a,b
[a]⊗ [b]⊗ [eab], (6)
where a and b denote Alice and Bob’s measurement out-
comes associated to the measurement projectors [a] and
[b]. Throughout this paper, square brackets denote one-
dimensional projector, e.g. [ψ] = |ψ〉〈ψ|. Note that
[eab] is not normalized, since |eab〉 = 〈ab|ψ〉ABE and
p (a, b) = tr[eab].
The following result, obtained in [19, 24], is largely
used in the next sections. After a collective attack de-
scribed by a state like (6), Alice and Bob’s one-way dis-
tillable key rate satisfies
K→ ≥ I(A : B)− I(A : E). (7)
5Here, the correlations between Alice and Bob’s classi-
cal variables are again quantified by the standard mu-
tual information, I(A : B). The correlations between
Alice’s classical and Eve’s quantum variables, A and E,
are quantified by the Holevo quantity,
I(A : E) = S(E)− S(E|A), (8)
where S denotes the Shannon entropy, so S(E) = S(ρE)
and S(E|A) = ∑a p (a)S(ρE |A = a). Actually the
“same” equation (7) applies when Bob is also able
to store quantum states and the three parties share
classical-quantum-quantum (CQQ) correlations. In this
case, both mutual information quantities between Al-
ice’s classical variable, A, and Bob’s and Eve’s quantum
states, denoted by B and E, should be understood as
Holevo quantities [19]. Notice the similarities between
(3) and (7). Indeed, the obtained bounds represent a
natural generalization of the CK-bound to the CCQ and
CQQ correlations scenarios.
C. General Attacks and the de Finetti Theorem
Finally, one has to consider the most general attack
where Eve can perform any kind of interaction. In this
case, Alice and Bob cannot assume to share N copies of
the same quantum state. Compared to the previous at-
tacks, there did not exist nice bounds for the extractable
key-rate under general attacks. However, very recently a
dramatic simplification on the security analysis of QKD
protocols under general attacks has been achieved by
means of the so-called de Finetti theorem [15]. Indeed,
Renner has proven that general attacks cannot be more
powerful than collective attacks in any protocol that is
symmetric in the use of the quantum channel. This pro-
vides a huge simplification in security proofs, since by
means of the de Finetti arguments (see [15] for more
details), Alice and Bob can safely assume to share N
copies of a quantum state consistent with their tomo-
graphic process, and then apply the existing bounds for
this scenario. Note that the de Finetti theorem should
also be employed if one wants to use entanglement dis-
tillation as a key distillation technique. In what follows,
then, we can restrict our analysis to collective attacks,
without underestimating Eve’s capabilities.
D. Review of the existing Security Bounds
Finally, we would like to summarize the existing se-
curity bounds for the two most known QKD protocols,
BB84 and six-state. These bounds are usually stated
in terms of the critical QBER such that key distilla-
tion is possible. Of course, these bounds depend on
the type of key distillation techniques employed by the
honest parties. Since the first general security proof of
BB84 by Mayers [25], security bounds have been con-
stantly improved. Using a quantum error-correction (of
BB84 Six-state
11.0% 12.4% 12.7% 14.1%
Generalsecurity without pre-processing
General security improved by pre-processing
QBER
FIG. 3: Security bounds for QKD protocols using key dis-
tillation techniques with one-way communication: based on
the analogy between these techniques and quantum error cor-
rection, the security bounds for the BB84 and the six-state
protocols are 11% and 12.7% respectively. These bounds have
later been improved by information-theoretic considerations
up to 12.4% and 14.1%. The improvement is achieved using
some classical pre-processing by one of the parties.
bit-flip and phase-inversion) description of classical one-
way error-correction and privacy amplification, Shor and
Preskill showed the general security of BB84 whenever
QBER < 11% [26]. Later, Lo adapted their proof to
6-state protocol obtaining a critical QBER of 12.7% [27].
More recently, Kraus, Renner, and Gisin have improved
these values by introducing some classical pre-processing
by the two honest parties, obtaining critical QBER’s of
12.4% for the BB84 and 14.1% for the six-state protocol
[24]. More recently, the bound for BB84 has been im-
proved up to 12.9% in Ref. [28]. On the other hand, the
known upper bounds on the critical QBER are slightly
higher than these lower bounds, so the exact value for
the critical QBER remains as an open question.
The honest parties however can apply CAD to their
outcomes before using one-way key-distillation tech-
niques and improve these bounds. The whole process
can now be mapped into a two-way entanglement distil-
lation protocol. Based on this analogy, Gottesman and
Lo have obtained that secure QKD is possible whenever
the QBER is smaller than 18.9% and 26.4% for the BB84
and six-state protocol, respectively [29]. Chau has im-
proved these bounds up to 20.0% and 27.6% respectively
[30]. The generalization of the formalism [24] to two-way
communication has also been done by Kraus, Branciard
and Renner [31]. We show in the next sections (see also
[14]) that, for larger QBER, no protocol consisting of
CAD followed by one-way distillation techniques works.
So, contrary to what happens in the case of one-way com-
munication, there is no gap between the lower and up-
per bounds for secure key distribution using the BB84
and six-state schemes, under the considered reconcilia-
tion techniques.
6BB84 Six-state
18.9% 20.0% 26.4% 33.3%
Securitybound shown in [29]
Improved by Chau [30]
QBER
25.0% 27.6%
FIG. 4: Security bounds for QKD protocols using two-way
followed by one-way communication techniques: based on the
analogy between the two-way plus one-way communication
and two-way entanglement distillation protocol, general secu-
rity bounds of the BB84 and the six-state protocols are given
by 18.9% and 26.4% respectively [29]. Later, Chau improved
the error correction method and the bounds are moved to
20.0% and 27.6% [30]. In sections IV and V, we show that
those bounds are tight. Note that the key distillability con-
dition is stronger than the entanglement condition, which is
25.0% and 33.3% for the BB84 and the six-state protocols.
IV. SECRECY PROPERTIES OF QUBIT
CHANNELS
After reviewing the main ideas and previous results
used in what follows, we are in position of deriving our
results. Consider the situation where Alice and Bob are
connected by a qubit channel. Alice locally prepares a
maximally entangled state of two qubits and sends half
of it through the channel. Then, both parties measure
the state. By repetition of this process, they can obtain a
complete, or partial, characterization of their channel, up
to some precision. Indeed, there exists a correspondence
between a channel, Υ, and the state
(1 ⊗Υ)|Φ+〉 = ρAB. (9)
Now, the parties agree on a pair of bases, that will later
be used for the raw key distribution. They repeat the
same process but now measure almost always in these
bases. However, with small probability, they have to
change their measurement to the previous tomographic
process in order to check the channel. After public com-
munication, they discard the asymptotically negligible
fraction of symbols where any of them did not use the
right basis and proceed with the key distillation. In
what follows, we provide a security analysis of this type
of schemes. Two important points should be mentioned
again: (i) as said, these schemes can be easily trans-
formed into a prepare and measure protocol, without
entanglement and (ii) using de Finetti theorem, Alice
and Bob can restrict Eve to collective attacks. In other
words, they can assume to share N independent copies
of the same state, ρ⊗NAB , that is, the channel does not in-
troduce correlation between the states. The goal, then,
consists of finding the optimal SIMCAP protocol for the
state ρAB, or equivalently, the best prepare and measure
scheme for the channel Υ.
Generically, ρAB can be any two-qubit state. However,
no key distillation is possible from separable states, so
Alice and Bob abort their protocol if their measured data
are consistent with a separable state [13]. We can assume,
if the state preparation is done by Alice, that her local
state, ρA, cannot be modified by Eve. In our type of
schemes, this state is equal to the identity. Although our
techniques can be used in the general situation, we mostly
restrict our analysis to the case where Bob’s state is also
equal to the identity. This is likely to be the case in any
realistic situation, where the channel affects with some
symmetry the flying qubits. This symmetry is reflected
by the local state on reception, i.e. ρB = 1 . In the qubit
case, the fact that the two local states are completely
random simply means that the global state ρAB is Bell
diagonal,
ρAB = λ1[Φ1] + λ2[Φ2] + λ3[Φ3] + λ4[Φ4], (10)
where
∑
j λj = 1, λj > 0, and
|Φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)
|Φ2〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)
|Φ3〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)
|Φ4〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) (11)
define the so-called Bell basis. Or in other words, Υ is a
Pauli channel. Pauli channels are very useful, as it will
become clearer below, in the analysis of the BB84 and
six-state protocols.
It is also worth mentioning here that Alice and Bob
can always transform their generic state ρAB into a Bell
diagonal state by single-copy filtering operations. Actu-
ally, this operation is optimal in terms of entanglement
concentration. Indeed, it maximizes the entanglement
of formation of any state ρ′AB ∝ (FA ⊗ FB)ρ(F †A ⊗ F †B)
obtained after LOCC operations of a single copy of ρAB
[32]. This filtering operation succeeds with probability
tr(FA ⊗ FB)ρ(F †A ⊗ F †B). If ρAB is already in a Bell-
diagonal form, it remains invariant under the filtering
operation. Alternatively, Alice and Bob can also map
their state into a Bell diagonal state by a depolarization
protocol, where they apply randomly correlated change
of basis, but some entanglement may be lost in this pro-
cess. In view of all these facts, in what follows we mainly
consider Bell diagonal states.
It is possible to identify a canonical form for these
states. This follows from the fact that Alice and Bob
can apply local unitary transformation such that
λ1 = max
i
λi, λ2 = min
i
λi . (12)
Indeed, they can permute the Bell basis elements by per-
7forming the following operations
T ([Φ1]↔ [Φ2]) = 2−1i(1 − iσz)⊗ (1 − iσz),
T ([Φ2]↔ [Φ3]) = 2−1(σx + σz)⊗ (σx + σz),
T ([Φ3]↔ [Φ4]) = 2−1(1 + iσz)⊗ (1 − iσz). (13)
Once the state has been casted in this canonical form, Al-
ice and Bob measure it in the computational basis. The
choice of the computational bases by Alice and Bob will
be justified by our analysis. Indeed, once a Bell-diagonal
state has been written in the previous canonical form,
the choice of the computational bases seems to maximize
the secret correlations between Alice and Bob, although,
in general, they may not maximize the total correlations.
Before Alice and Bob’ measurements, the global state
including Eve is a pure state that purifies Alice and Bob’s
Bell diagonal state, that is,
|Ψ〉ABE =
4∑
j=1
√
λj |Φj〉|j〉E (14)
where |j〉E define an orthonormal basis on Eve’s space.
All the purifications of Alice-Bob state are equivalent
from Eve’s point of view, since they only differ from a
unitary operation in her space. After the measurements,
Alice, Bob and Eve share CCQ correlations. In the next
sections we study when these correlations can be dis-
tilled into a secure key using the standard CAD followed
by one-way distillation protocols. We first obtain a suf-
ficient condition for securtiy, using the lower bounds on
the secret-key rate given above, c.f. (7). Then, we com-
pute a necessary condition that follows from a specific
eavesdropping attack. It is then shown that the two
conditions coincide, so the resulting security condition
is necessary and sufficient, under the mentioned distil-
lation techniques. Next, we apply this condition to two
known examples, the BB84 and the six-state protocols.
We finally discuss several ways of improving the derived
condition, by changing the distillation techniques, includ-
ing classical pre-processing by the parties or one-party’s
coherent quantum operations.
A. Sufficient condition
In this section we will derive the announced suffi-
cient condition for security using the lower bound on the
secret-key rate of Eq. (7). Just before the measurements,
the honest parties share a Bell diagonal state (10). This
state is entangled if and only if
∑4
j=2 λj < λ1, which
follows from the fact that the positivity of the partial
transposition is a necessary and sufficient condition for
separability in 2 × 2 systems [33]. When Alice and Bob
measure in their computational bases, they are left with
classical data [i, j ]AB(i, j ∈ {0, 1}) whereas Eve still
holds a quantum correlated system |ei,j〉E . The CCQ
correlations they share are described by the state (up to
normalization)
ρABE ∝
∑
i,j
[i, j ]AB ⊗ [e˜i,j ]E , (15)
where Eve’s states are
|e˜0,0〉 =
√
λ1|1〉+
√
λ2|2〉
|e˜0,1〉 =
√
λ3|3〉+
√
λ4|4〉
|e˜1,0〉 =
√
λ3|3〉 −
√
λ4|4〉
|e˜1,1〉 =
√
λ1|1〉 −
√
λ2|2〉, (16)
and the corresponding states without tilde denote the
normalized vectors. So, after the measurements, Alice
and Bob map ρ⊗NAB , into a list of measurement outcomes,
whose correlations are given by PAB(i, j), where
PAB(i, j) = 〈ij|ρAB|ij〉. (17)
This probability distribution reads as follows:
A \ B 0 1
0 (1− ǫAB)/2 ǫAB/2
1 ǫAB/2 (1− ǫAB)/2
Here, ǫAB denotes the QBER, that is,
ǫAB = 〈01|ρAB|01〉+ 〈10|ρAB|10〉 = λ3 + λ4. (18)
Alice and Bob now apply CAD to a block of N sym-
bols. Eve listens to the public communication that the
two honest parties exchange. In particular, she has the
position of the N symbols used by Alice in (2), in case
the honest parties use CAD1 or the N -bit string X for
CAD2. In the second case, Eve applies to each of her
symbols the unitary transformation
Ui = [1]E + (−1)Xi [2]E + [3]E + (−1)Xi [4]E. (19)
This unitary operation transforms |ei,j〉E into |es,j〉E
where s is the secret bit generated by Alice. If Alice
and Bob apply CAD1, Eve does nothing. In both cases,
the resulting state is
ρNABE =
(1 − ǫN)
2
∑
s=0,1
[s, s]AB ⊗ [es,s]⊗N +
ǫN
2
∑
s=0,1
[s, s+ 1]AB ⊗ [es,s+1]⊗N , (20)
where ǫN is Alice-Bob error probability after CAD,
ǫN =
ǫNAB
ǫNAB + (1− ǫAB)N
≤
(
ǫAB
1− ǫAB
)N
, (21)
and the last inequality tends to an equality when N →
∞. That is, whatever the advantage distillation protocol
is, i.e. either CAD1 or CAD2, all the correlations among
the three parties before the one-way key extraction step
are described by the state (20).
We can now apply Eq. (7) to this CQQ state.
The probability distribution between Alice and Bob has
changed to
8A \ B 0 1
0 (1− ǫN )/2 ǫN/2
1 ǫN/2 (1 − ǫN)/2
where it can be seen that Alice and Bob have improved
their correlation. The CAD protocol has changed the ini-
tial probability distribution P (A,B), with error rate ǫAB,
into P
′
(A,B), with error rate ǫN . The mutual informa-
tion between Alice and Bob I(A : B) is easily computed
from the above table. I(A : E) can be derived from (20),
so, after some algebra, the following equality is obtained
I(A : B)− I(A : E) = 1− h(ǫN )
−(1− ǫN)h
(
1− ΛMeq
2
)
− ǫN h
(
1− ΛMdif
2
)
, (22)
where
Λeq =
λ1 − λ2
λ1 + λ2
= |〈e0,0|e1,1〉|
Λdif =
|λ3 − λ4|
λ3 + λ4
= |〈e1,0|e0,1〉|, (23)
h(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary entropy,
and the subscript ‘eq’ (‘dif’) refers to the resulting value
of Alice being equal to (different from) that of Bob.
Let’s compute this quantity in the limit of a large num-
ber of copies, N ≫ 1, where ǫN ,Λeq,Λdif ≪ 1. It can be
seen that in this limit
I(A : B) ≈ 1 + ǫN log ǫN
I(A : E) ≈ 1− 1
ln 4
Λ2Neq . (24)
The security condition follows from having positive value
of the Eq. (22), which holds if
|〈e0,0|e1,1〉|2 > ǫB
1− ǫB . (25)
More precisely, if this condition is satisfied, Alice and
Bob can always establish a large but finite N such that
Eq. (22) becomes positive. Eq. (25) can be rewritten as
(λ1 + λ2)(λ3 + λ4) < (λ1 − λ2)2. (26)
Therefore, whenever the state of Alice and Bob satisfies
the security condition (25) above, they can extract from
ρAB a secret key with our SIMCAP protocol. This gives
the searched sufficient condition for security for two two-
qubit Bell diagonal states or, equivalently, Pauli chan-
nels. Later, it is proven that whenever condition (25)
does not hold, there exists an attack by Eve such that no
standard key-distillation protocol works.
Condition (25) has a clear physical meaning. The r.h.s
of (22) quantifies how fast Alice and Bob’s error probabil-
ity goes to zero when N increases. In the same limit, and
since there are almost no errors in the symbols filtered
by the CAD process, Eve has to distinguish between N
copies of |e0,0〉 and |e1,1〉. The trace distance between
these two states provides a measure of this distinguisha-
bility. It is easy to see that for large N
tr|[e0,0]⊗N − [e1,1]⊗N | = 2
√
1− |〈e0,0|e1,1〉|2N
≈ 2− |〈e0,0|e1,1〉|2N . (27)
Thus, the l.h.s. of (22) quantifies how the distinguisha-
bility of the two quantum states on Eve’s side after CAD
increases with N . This intuitive idea is indeed behind
the attack described in the next section.
Once this sufficient condition has been obtained, we
can justify the choice of the computational bases for the
measurements by Alice and Bob when sharing a state
(10). Note that the same reasoning as above can be ap-
plied to any choice of bases. The derived security con-
dition simply quantifies how Alice-Bob error probability
goes to zero with N compared to Eve’s distinguishability
of the N copies of the states |e0,0〉 and |e1,1〉, correspond-
ing to the cases a = b = 0 and a = b = 1. The obtained
conditions are not as simple as for measurements in the
computational bases, but they can be easily computed us-
ing numerical means. One can, then, perform a numerical
optimization over all choice of bases by Alice and Bob.
An exhaustive search shows that computational bases are
optimal for this type of security condition. It is interest-
ing to mention that the bases that maximize the classical
correlations, or minimize the error probability, between
Alice and Bob do not correspond to the computational
bases for all Bell diagonal states (10). Thus, these bases
optimize the secret correlations between the two hon-
est parties, according to our security condition, although
they may be not optimal for classical correlations.
B. Necessary condition
After presenting the security condition (25), we now
give an eavesdropping attack that breaks our SIMCAP
protocol whenever this condition does not hold. This
attack is very similar to that in Ref. [34].
Without loss of generality, we assume that all the com-
munication in the one-way reconciliation part of the pro-
tocol goes from Alice to Bob. In this attack, Eve delays
her measurement until Alice and Bob complete the CAD
part of the distillation protocol. Then, she applies on
each of her systems the two-outcome measurement de-
fined by the projectors
Feq = [1]E + [2]E, Fdif = [3]E + [4]E . (28)
According to (20), all N measurements give the same
outcome. If Eve obtains the outcome corresponding to
Feq, the tripartite state becomes (up to normalization)
[00]AB ⊗ [e0,0]⊗NE + [11]AB ⊗ [e1,1]⊗NE . (29)
In order to learn sA, Alice’s bit, she has to discriminate
between the two pure states |e0,0〉⊗N and |e1,1〉⊗N . The
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FIG. 5: Graphical depiction of the security condition (26):
the security region is defined by the intersection of the en-
tanglement condition λ1 > 1/2, the normalization condition
λ1 + λ2 < 1, and the security condition (26).
minimum error probability in such discrimination is [35]
ǫeq =
1
2
− 1
2
√
1− |〈e0,0|e1,1〉|2N , (30)
Her guess for Alice’s symbol is denoted by sE . On the
other hand, if Eve obtains the outcome corresponding to
Fdif , the state of the three parties is
[01]AB ⊗ [e0,1]⊗NE + [10]AB ⊗ [e1,0]⊗NE . (31)
The corresponding error probability ǫdif is the same
as in Eq. (30), with the replacement |〈e0,0|e1,1〉| →
|〈e0,1|e1,0〉|. Note that |〈e0,0|e1,1〉| ≥ |〈e0,1|e1,0〉|. Eve’s
information now consists of sE , as well as the outcome
of the measurement (28), rE = {eq, dif}. It is shown in
what follows that the corresponding probability distribu-
tion P (sA, sB, (sE , rE)) cannot be distilled using one-way
communication. In order to do that, we show that Eve
can always map P into a new probability distribution,
Q, which is not one-way distillable. Therefore, the non-
distillability of P is implied.
Eve’s mapping from P to Q works as follows: she
increases her error until ǫdif = ǫeq. She achieves this
by changing with some probability the value of sE
when rE = dif. After this, Eve forgets rE . The
resulting tripartite probability distribution Q satisfies
Q(sB, sE |sA) = Q(sB|sA)Q(sE |sA). Additionally, we
know that Q(sB|sA) and Q(sE|sA) are binary symmet-
ric channels with error probability ǫB(= ǫN in (21)) and
ǫeq in (30), respectively. It is proven in [20] that in such
situation the one-way key rate is
K→ = h(ǫeq)− h(ǫB), (32)
which is non-positive if
ǫeq ≤ ǫB . (33)
Let us finally show that this inequality is satisfied for all
values of N whenever the condition (25) does not hold.
Writing z = λ1 + λ2, we have 1/2 ≤ z ≤ 1, since the
state of Alice and Bob is assumed entangled. Using the
following inequality
1
2
− 1
2
√
1−
(
1− z
z
)N
≤ (1− z)
N
zN + (1 − z)N , (34)
which holds for any positiveN , the right-hand side of (34)
is equal to ǫB, whereas the left-hand side is an upper
bound for ǫeq. This bound follows from the inequality
(λ1 − λ2)2/z2 ≤ (1− z)/z, which is the negation of (25).
That is, if condition (25) is violated, no secret key can
be distilled with our SIMCAP protocol. More precisely,
there exists no N such that CAD followed by one-way
distillation allows to establish a secret key. Since (25) is
sufficient for security, the attack we have considered is in
some sense optimal and the security bound (25) is tight
for our SIMCAP protocol.
It is worth analyzing the resources that this optimal
eavesdropping attack requires. First of all, note that Eve
does not need to perform any coherent quantum opera-
tion, but she only requires single-copy level (individual)
measurements. This is because when discriminating N
copies of two states, there exists an adaptative sequence
of individual measurements which achieves the optimal
error probability (30) [36]. However, what Eve really
needs is the ability to store her quantum states after lis-
tening to the (public) communication exchanged by Alice
and Bob during the CAD part of the protocol.
C. Inequivalence of CAD1 and CAD2 for
individual attacks
As we have seen, the two CAD protocols lead to the
same security condition. This follows from the fact that
Eve is not assumed to measure her state before the CAD
takes place. Then, she can effectively map one CAD pro-
tocol into the other by means of the reversible operation
UE . This is no longer true in the case of individual at-
tacks. Interestingly, in this scenario, the two two-way
distillation methods do not give the same security con-
dition. As mentioned, although the study of individual
attacks gives a weaker security, it is relevant in the case of
realistic eavesdroppers. Moreover, we believe the present
example has some interest as a kind of toy model illus-
trating the importance of the reconciliation part for secu-
rity. Recall that in the case of individual attacks, where
Eve can neither perform coherent operations nor have a
quantum memory, the security condition using CAD2 is
the entanglement condition λ1 > 1/2 [8]. However, when
the honest parties apply CAD1 plus one-way communi-
cation, the security condition is (25). This holds true for
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two-qubit protocols, and remains open for the two-qudit
protocols studied in the next sections [37].
Let us suppose that Alice and Bob apply CAD1 and
consider the following individual attack. Eve knows that
for all the instances passing the CAD protocol, Alice
and Bob’s symbols are equal with very high probability.
Moreover, she knows that in all the position announced
by Alice, Alice’s symbol is the same. Therefore, from her
point of view, the problem reduces to the discrimination
ofN copies of the two states |ei,i〉. Thus, she has to apply
the measurement that optimally discriminates between
these two states. As mentioned, the optimal two-state
discrimination [36] can be achieved by an adaptive indi-
vidual measurement strategy. Therefore, Eve can apply
this adaptive strategy to her states right after her indi-
vidual interaction. Her error probability is again given
by (30). That is, although the attack is individual, the
corresponding security condition is the same as for col-
lective attacks.
This N -copy situation on Eve’s space does not happen
when Alice and Bob apply CAD2. Indeed, Eve maps
CAD2 into CAD1 by applying the correcting unitary
operation Ui after knowing the vector X used in CAD2.
This is the key point that allowed her to map one situa-
tion into the other above. This is however not possible in
the case of individual attacks, where Eve is assumed to
measure before the reconciliation part takes place. Un-
der individual attacks, the security condition for CAD2
is equivalent to the entanglement condition for Bell di-
agonal states, as shown in [8]. Therefore, the two CAD
protocols, which have proven to be equivalent in terms
of robustness against general quantum attacks, become
inequivalent in the restricted case of individual attacks.
V. BB84 AND SIX-STATE PROTOCOLS
The goal of the previous study has been to provide a
general formalism for determining the security of qubit
channels under a class of realistic QKD protocols. Rel-
evant prepare and measure schemes, such as the BB84
and six-state protocol, constitute a particular case of our
analysis. Indeed, the process of correlation distribution
and channel tomography in these protocols is done by
Alice preparing states from and Bob measuring in two
(BB84) or three (six-state) bases. In this section, we
apply the derived security condition to these protocols
and compare the obtained results with previous security
bounds. As explained in IIID, a standard figure of merit
in the security analysis of a given QKD protocol is given
by the maximum error rate such that key distillation is
still possible. For instance, in the case of one-way com-
munication, the values of the critical error rates keep im-
proving (see [28] for the latest result in this sense) since
the first general security proof by Mayers [25]. In the case
of reconciliation using two-way communication, the best
known results were obtained by Chau in [30]. It is then
important to know whether these bound can be further
improved. In what follows, it is shown that our necessary
condition for security implies that Chau’s bounds cannot
be improved. In order to do that, then, one has to employ
other reconciliation techniques, different from advantage
distillation plus one-way standard techniques. Some of
these possibilities are discussed in the next sections.
A. BB84 protocol
In the BB84 protocol [2], bits are encoded into two
sets of mutually unbiased bases {|0〉, |+〉} and {|1〉, |−〉}
respectively, where |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. One can easily
see that in the entanglement-based scheme, a family of
attacks by Eve producing a QBER Q is given by the
Bell-diagonal states (see also [38])
ρAB = (1−2Q+x)[Φ1]+(Q−x)[Φ2]+(Q−x)[Φ3]+x[Φ4],
(35)
since the QBER is
Q = 〈01|ρAB|01〉+ 〈10|ρAB|10〉
= 〈+ − |ρAB|+−〉+ 〈−+ |ρAB| −+〉 (36)
and 0 ≤ x ≤ Q. When Alice and Bob apply one-way
communication distillation, the attack that minimizes (7)
is x = Q2, and leads to the well-known value of QBER =
11%, first obtained by Shor and Preskill in [26]. The
corresponding unitary interaction by Eve is equal to the
phase-covariant cloning machine, that optimally clones
qubits in an equator (in this case, in the xz plane).
When one considers the two-way distillation techniques
studied in this work, condition (25), or (26), applies.
Then, one can see that the optimal attack, for fixed
QBER, consists of taking x = 0. Therefore, Eve’s at-
tack is, not surprisingly, strongly dependent on the type
of reconciliation employed. In the case of two-way com-
munication, Eve’s optimal interaction can also be seen
as a generalized phase-covariant cloning transformation,
which is shown in the Appendix I. Using this attack,
the derived necessary condition for security is violated
when QBER = 20%. This is precisely the same value
obtained by Chau in his general security proof of BB84
[30]. So, the considered collective attack turns out to be
tight, in terms of robustness. Recall that the security
bound against individual attacks is at the entanglement
limit, in this case giving QBER = 25.0% [8, 33]. The
full comparison is depicted in the Fig. (4).
Note also that the state (35) with x = 0, associated to
the optimal attack, does not fit into our canonical form
for Bell diagonal states, since λ2 is not the minimal Bell
coefficient. This simply means that key distillation from
this state using a SIMCAP protocol is still possible. Al-
ice and Bob only have to measure in a different basis,
namely in the y basis. That is, if Alice and Bob knew
to share this state, or channel, and could prepare and
measure states in the y basis, not used in the considered
version of BB84, they would be able to establish a secure
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FIG. 6: Security bounds of the BB84 and the six-state pro-
tocols against individual and collective attacks: When Eve is
supposed to apply individual attacks, all entangled states are
distillable to a secret key. Assuming general attacks, security
bounds are 20.0% and 27.6%, respectively, for the BB84 and
the six-state protocols. This means that non-distillable secret
correlations may exist(see, the section VI).
key. This channel is still useful for QKD using a prepare
and measure scheme, although not using the considered
version of BB84. In our opinion, this illustrates why the
present approach, that aims at identifying secrecy prop-
erties of channels without referring to a given protocol,
is more general.
B. Six-state protocol
If a third mutually unbiased basis, in the y direction,
is added to BB84, one obtains the so-called six-state pro-
tocol. The information encoding is as follows: bit 0 is en-
coded on states {|0〉, |+〉, |+ i〉}, and 1 in {|1〉, |−〉, |− i〉},
where | ± i〉 = (|0〉 ± i|1〉)/√2 [10]. It is easy to see that
an attack by Eve producing a QBER equal to Q is given
by the Bell diagonal state
ρAB = (1− 3
2
Q)[Φ1] +
Q
2
[Φ2] +
Q
2
[Φ3] +
Q
2
[Φ4]. (37)
This attack actually corresponds to Eve applying the uni-
versal cloning transformation. Contrary to what hap-
pened for BB84, this attack is optimal for both types of
reconciliation protocols, using one- or two-way commu-
nication.
Applying the security condition (25), the security
bound gives a critical QBER of Q = 27.6%. This value
again coincides with the one obtained by Chau in his gen-
eral security proof of [30] for the six-state protocol. The
present attack, then, is again tight. In the case of indid-
ual attacks, the security bound [8] is the entanglement
limit Q = 33.3%.
VI. CAN THESE BOUNDS BE IMPROVED?
The previous section has applied the obtained secu-
rity condition to two well-known QKD protocols. In the
corresponding attack, Eve is forced to interact individ-
ually and in the same way with the sent qubits. As
discussed, the de Finetti results by Renner imply that
this does not pose any restriction on Eve’s attack. How-
ever, Eve is also assumed to measure her states right
after CAD, while she could have delayed her measure-
ment, for instance until the end of the entire reconcilia-
tion. In spite of this apparent limitation, the condition is
shown to be tight, under the considered distillation tech-
niques, for the two protocols. As it has been mentioned,
the obtained bounds do not coincide with the entangle-
ment limit. This raises the question whether prepare and
measure schemes, in general, do attain this limit. Or in
other words, it suggests the existence of channels that,
although can be used to distribute distillable entangle-
ment, are useless for QKD using prepare and measure
techniques. Recall that a channel that allows to estab-
lish distillable entanglement is secure: this just follows
from combining the de Finetti argument with standard
entanglement distillation. So, in this sense the channel
indeed contains distillable secrecy. However, our results
suggest that this secrecy is non-distillable, or bound, us-
ing single-copy measurements. That is, this secrecy is
distillable only if both parties are able to perform coher-
ent quantum operations. Perhaps, the simplest example
of this channel is given by (37) with Q > 27.6%, i.e. by
a weakly entangling depolarizing channel.
The aim of this section is to explore two possibilities to
improve the previous security bounds. We first consider
the classical pre-processing introduced in [24]. In this
work, previous security bounds using one-way communi-
cation protocols for BB84 and six-state protocols have
been improved by allowing one of the honest parties to
introduce some local noise. This noise worsens the cor-
relations between Alice and Bob, but it deteriorates in
a stronger way the correlations between Alice and Eve.
Here, we study whether a similar effect can be obtained in
the case of the considered two-way communication pro-
tocols. In a similar way as in Ref. [24], we allow one
of the two parties to introduce some noise, given by a
binary symmetric channel (BSC). In our case, however,
this form of pre-processing does not give any improve-
ment on the security bounds. Later, we study whether
the use of coherent quantum operations by one of the
parties helps. We analyze a protocol that can be un-
derstood as a hybrid between classical and entanglement
distillation protocol. Remarkably, this protocol does not
provide any improvement either. In our opinion, these re-
sults strengthen the conjectured bound secrecy of these
weakly entangled states when using SIMCAP protocols
[39].
A. Pre-processing by one party
Recently, it has been observed that local classical pre-
processing by the honest parties of their measurement
outcomes can improve the security bounds of some QKD
protocols [24]. For instance, Alice can map her mea-
surement values X into another random variable U , and
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this transforms the mutual information from I(X : B)
into I(U : B). At the same time, I(X : E) changes to
I(U : E). In general, this mapping makes the mutual in-
formation of Alice and Bob decrease, but bounds on the
secret key rate may improve, e.g. I(U : B)− I(U : E) >
I(X : B) − I(X : E). Actually, by applying a simple
BSC of probability q, where the input value is kept un-
changed with probability 1−q or flipped with probability
q, Alice may be able to improve the one-way secret-key
rate [24]. Using this technique, the security bounds have
been moved from 11% to 12.4% for the BB84 protocol
and from 12.7% to 14.1% in the six-state protocol [24].
Here, we analyze whether a similar effect happens in the
case of protocols consisting of two-way communication.
Note that pre-processing is useless if applied after CAD.
Indeed, recall that the situation after CAD for the at-
tack of Section IVB is simply given by two independent
BSC channels between Alice and Bob and Alice and Eve,
where pre-processing is known to be useless. The only
possibility left is that Alice and/or Bob apply this pre-
processing before the whole reconciliation protocol takes
place.
As mentioned, Alice’s pre-processing consists of a BSC
channel, where her measurement value j is mapped into
j and j + 1 with probabilities 1 − q and q, respectively.
After this classical pre-processing, the state of the three
parties is
σABE ∝
∑
i,j
[i, j]AB ⊗ [ρ˜i,j ]
where
ρ˜0,0 = (1− q)(1 − ǫAB)[e0,0] + qǫAB[e1,0]
ρ˜0,1 = (1− q)ǫAB[e0,1] + q(1 − ǫAB)[e1,1]
ρ˜1,0 = q(1− ǫAB)[e0,0] + (1 − q)ǫAB[e1,0]
ρ˜1,1 = qǫAB[e0,1] + (1− q)(1 − ǫAB)[e1,1]
(38)
and ǫAB denotes the QBER of the original measurement
data, i.e. the error rate before applying pre-processing.
Again, the states with tilde are not normalized, so
ρ˜i,i =
(
(1− q)(1 − ǫAB
2
) + q
ǫAB
2
)
ρi,i
ρ˜i,i+1 =
(
(1− q)ǫAB
2
+ q(
1− ǫAB
2
)
)
ρi,i+1.
Next, Alice and Bob apply two-way CAD to σ⊗NABE . A
new error rate is obtained after CAD. The rest of the
distillation part, then, follows the same steps as in section
V-A.
We now compute the mutual information between the
honest parties after CAD. The new error rate of Alice and
Bob is introduced by the BSC above, and is expressed
as ω = trABE [σABE(|01〉AB〈01| + |10〉AB〈10|)] = (1 −
q)ǫAB+ q(1− ǫAB). For large N , the mutual information
of Alice and Bob tends to, c.f. (24),
Noisy Quantum
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FIG. 7: Considered classical pre-processing: Alice introduces
some extra noise by permuting her classical variable with
probability q.
IP (A : B) ≈ 1 + ( ω
1− ω )
N log(
ω
1− ω )
N .
In the same limit, Eve’s state can be very well approxi-
mated by
σE ≈ 1
2
(ρ⊗N00 + ρ
⊗N
11 ),
since ||ρ˜i,i|| > ||ρ˜i,j ||. After some patient algebra, one
can see that the Holevo information of Alice and Eve
channel is (see also Appendix II):
IP (A : E) ≈ 1− 1
ln 4
(u|〈e0,0|e1,1〉|2 + v|〈e0,1|e1,0〉|2)N
where
u =
(1− q)(1 − ǫAB)
qǫAB + (1− q)(1 − ǫAB) ,
and u + v = 1. The case of q = 0 (or equivalently,
u = 1) recovers the initial mutual information I(A : E).
Therefore, the security condition of this protocol is
u|〈e0,0|e1,1〉|2 + v|〈e0,1|e1,0〉|2 > ω
1− ω . (39)
More precisely, whenever this condition is satisfied, there
exists a finite N such that IP (A : B)− IP (A : E) > 0.
The derived bound looks again intuitive. The r.h.s
quantifies how Alice and Bob’s error probability for the
accepted symbols converges to zero when N is large. If
one computes the trace distance between ρ0,0 and ρ1,1,
as defined in Eq. (38), one can see that
tr|ρ0,0 − ρ1,1| ≈ 2− (u|〈e0,0|e1,1〉|2 + v|〈e0,1|e1,0〉|2)N ,
(40)
which gives the l.h.s. of (39). This result suggests that
the derived condition may again be tight. That is, it is
likely there exists an attack by Eve breaking the security
of the protocol whenever (39) is not satisfied. This attack
would basically be the same as above, where Eve simply
has to measure after the CAD part of the protocol.
Our goal is to see whether there exist situations where
pre-processing is useful. Assume this is the case, that is,
there exists a state for which (39) holds, for some value
of q, while (25) does not. Then,
ǫAB
1− ǫAB ≥ |〈e00|e11〉|
2 >
1
u
(
ω
1− ω − v|〈e01|e10〉|
2). (41)
13
After some simple algebra, one gets the inequality:
1
ǫAB
< 1 + |〈e01|e10〉|2.
The r.h.s. of this equation is smaller than 2, and this
implies that ǫAB > 1/2. However, this contradicts 0 ≤
ǫAB < 1/2, so we conclude that one-party pre-processing
does not improve the obtained security bound.
Notice that since the reconciliation part uses commu-
nication in both directions, it seems natural to consider
pre-processing by the two honest parties, where Alice
and Bob introduce some noise, described by the prob-
abilities qA and qB. In this case, however, the analyt-
ical derivation is much more involved, even in the case
of symmetric pre-processing. Our preliminary numerical
calculations suggest that two-parties pre-processing may
be useless as well. However, these calculations should be
interpreted in a very careful way. Indeed, they become
too demanding already for a moderate N , since one has
to compute the von Neumann entropies for states in a
large Hilbert space, namely ρ⊗N0,0 and ρ
⊗N
1,1 . Therefore,
the detailed analysis of pre-processing by the two honest
parties remains to be done.
Before concluding, we would like to mention that pre-
processing, before or after CAD, may help in improving
the distillable secret-key rate if the initial rate without
pre-processing is already positive (see for instance [15]).
However, this improvement vanishes for large blocks and
the obtained security bounds do not change.
B. Bob’s coherent operations do not improve the
security bound
In order to improve the security bound, we also con-
sider the scenario where Bob performs some coherent
quantum operations before his measurement. Thus, he
is assumed to be able to store quantum states and ma-
nipulate them in a coherent way, see Fig. 8. This is very
unrealistic, but it gives the ultimate limit for positive
key-rate using the corresponding prepare and measure
protocol. We do not solve the problem in full generality.
Here we consider the rather natural protocol where Bob
applies the recurrence protocol used in entanglement dis-
tillation. That is, he applies CNOT operations to N of
his qubits and measures all but one. He accepts only
when the results of these N − 1 measurements are zero
and keeps the remaining qubit. Later Bob applies a col-
lective measurement on all the accepted qubits. Alice’s
part of the protocol remains unchanged.
After Alice has measured her states and announced the
position of N symbols having the same value, Alice-Bob-
Eve state reads
ρABE = [0]A ⊗ [b˜e0]⊗NBE + [1]A ⊗ [b˜e1]⊗NBE , (42)
where |b˜ei〉 = 〈i|ψ〉ABE . Note that Alice, Bob and Eve
now share CQQ correlations. Bob applies his part of the
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FIG. 8: Quantum advantage distillation protocol: Alice per-
forms single-copy measurement and processes the obtained
classical outcomes. Bob keeps his quantum states on a quan-
tum memory and performs coherent quantum operations.
protocol and accepts. The resulting state turns out to be
equal to, up to normalization,
ρNABE ∝ [0]⊗ [|0〉|e˜0,0〉⊗N + |1〉|e˜0,1〉⊗N ] +
[1]⊗ [|0〉|e˜1,0〉⊗N + |1〉|e˜1,1〉⊗N ]. (43)
Since Bob is allowed to apply any coherent operation,
the extractable key rate satisfies (7), where now both
information quantities, I(A : B) and I(A : E), are equal
to the corresponding Holevo bound. Of course I(A : E)
has not changed. It is straightforward to see that one
obtains the same bound for the key rate as for the state
(15). This follows from the fact that 〈ei,i|ei,j〉 = 0, where
i 6= j. Then, this hybrid protocol does not provide any
advantage with respect to SIMCAP protocols.
Recall that if the two parties apply coherent quantum
operations, they can run entanglement distillation and
distill from any entangled two-qubit state. Actually a
slightly different protocol where (i) both parties perform
the coherent recurrence protocol previously applied only
by Bob, (ii) measure in the computational bases and (iii)
apply standard one-way reconciliation techniques is se-
cure for any entangled state. As shown, if one of the
parties applies the “incoherent” version of this distilla-
tion protocol, consisting of first measurement and later
CAD, followed by classical one-way distillation, the crit-
ical QBER decreases.
VII. GENERALIZATION TO ARBITRARY
DIMENSION
In the previous sections we have provided a general for-
malism for the study of key distribution through quan-
tum channels using prepare and measure schemes and
two-way key distillation. In the important case of Pauli
channels, we have derived a simple necessary and suffi-
cient condition for security, for the considered protocols.
In the next sections, we move to higher dimension, where
the two honest parties employ d−dimensional quantum
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systems, or qudits. The generalization of the previous
qubit scenario to arbitrary dimension is straightforward.
Alice locally generates a d−dimensional maximally en-
tangled state,
|Φ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
|k〉|k〉 (44)
measures the first particle of the pair, and sends the other
one to Bob. Since the channel between Alice and Bob is
noisy, the shared state will change into a mixed state
ρAB. As usual, all the noise in the channel is due to
Eve’s interaction.
In what follows, we consider generalized Pauli chan-
nels. For these channels, Eve introduces flip and phase
errors, generalizing the standard bit-flip σx and phase-
flip σz operators of qubits. This generalization is given
by the unitary operators
Um,n =
d−1∑
k=0
exp(
2πi
d
kn)|k +m〉〈k|.
Thus, a quantum system in state ρ propagating through
a generalized Pauli channel is affected by a Um,n flip with
probability pm,n, that is
D(ρ) =
∑
m,n
pm,nUm,nρU
†
m,n.
When applied to half of a maximally entangled state |Φ〉,
the resulting state is Bell-diagonal,
(1 ⊗D)(Φ) =
d−1∑
m=0
d−1∑
n=0
pm,n|Bm,n〉〈Bm,n|, (45)
where the states |Bm,n〉 define the generalized Bell basis
|Bm,n〉 = (1 ⊗ Um,n)|Φ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
e
2pii
d
kn|k〉|k +m〉.
(46)
The global state including Eve reads
|ψABE〉 =
d−1∑
m=0
d−1∑
n=0
cm,n|Bm,n〉AB|m,n〉E , (47)
where c2m,n = pm,n and {|m,n〉} defines a basis.
In the next lines, we derive a security conditions for
these channels when the two honest parties measure in
the computational bases. We restrict to the computa-
tional bases for the sake of simplicity, although the main
ideas of the formalism can be applied to any bases, and
then numerically optimized. We then generalize the pre-
vious eavesdropping attack. Contrary to what happened
in the qubit case, we are unable to prove the tightness of
our condition in full generality using this attack.
We then apply the derived security condition to the
known protocols in d-dimensional systems, such as the 2-
and (d+1)-bases protocols. These protocols can be seen
as the natural generalization of the BB84 and the six-
state protocols to higher dimension [16]. Exploiting the
symmetries of these schemes, we can prove the tightness
of our security condition for these protocols. In the case
of the (d+1)-bases protocol, some security bounds using
two-way communication have been obtained by Chau in
[40]. Here, we obtain the same values, therefore proving
that they cannot be improved unless another reconcil-
iation protocol is employed. Moreover, in the case of
2-bases protocol, we derive the same security bound as
in [41]. Thus, again, another reconciliation protocol is
necessary if the bound is to be improved.
A. Sufficient condition
After sending half of a maximally entangled state
through the Pauli channel, Alice and Bob share the state
ρAB =
∑
m,n
pm,n|Bm,n〉〈Bm,n|,
where the probabilities pm,n characterize the generalized
Pauli channel. After measuring in the computational
bases, the two honest parties obtain correlated results.
We denote by F , fidelity, the probability that Alice and
Bob get the same measurement outcome. It reads
F =
d−1∑
k=0
〈kk|ρAB|kk〉 =
∑
n
p0,n.
In a similar way as for the qubit case, we introduce a
measure of disturbance for the d− 1 possible errors. De-
note Alice’s measurement result by α. Then, Bob obtains
α+ j, with probability
Dj =
d−1∑
α=0
P (A = α,B = α+ j) =
d−1∑
n=0
pj,n.
The total disturbance is defined as
D =
∑
j 6=0
Dj . (48)
Of course, D0 = F . Notice that all the Dj can be taken
smaller than F , without loss of generality. Indeed, if
this was not the case, the two honest parties could apply
local operations Um,n to make the fidelity F larger than
any other Dj . Note also that the errors have different
probabilities Dj.
We now include Eve in the picture, the resulting global
state being (47). As for the qubit case, Eve’s interaction
by means of the Pauli operators can be formulated as
an asymmetric 1 → 1 + 1 cloning transformation [23].
In what follows, and again invoking the de Finetti argu-
ment, it is assumed that Alice, Bob and Eve share many
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copies of the state (47). After the measurements by Alice
and Bob, the quantum state describing the CCQ corre-
lations between the three parties is
ρABE ∝
d−1∑
α=0
d−1∑
β=0
[α, β]AB ⊗ [e˜α,β]E . (49)
Eve’s states are
|eα,α〉 = 1√
F
d−1∑
n=0
c0,ne
2pii
d
αn|0, n〉
|eα,β〉 = 1√
Dβ−α
d−1∑
n=0
cβ−α,ne
2pii
d
αn|β − α, n〉
(50)
where the algebra is modulo d and β 6= α. As above, the
states with tilde are not normalized,
|e˜α,α〉 =
√
F |eα,α〉
|e˜α,β〉 =
√
Dβ−α|eα,β〉.
Note that 〈eα,β |ex,y〉 = 0 whenever β − α 6= y − x, so
Eve can know in a deterministic way which error (if any)
occurred between Alice and Bob.
After the measurements, Alice and Bob have a list
of correlated measurement outcomes. They now ap-
ply CAD. First, Alice locally generates a random vari-
able, sA, that can take any value between 0 and d − 1
with uniform probability. She then takes N of her
symbols (α1, · · · , αN ) and announces the vector ~X =
(X1, · · · , XN) such that Xj = s−αj . Bob sums this vec-
tors to his corresponding symbols (β1, · · · , βN ). If the N
results are equal, and we denote by sB the corresponding
result, he accepts sB. It is simple to see that Bob accepts
a symbol with probability pok = F
N +
∑d−1
j=1 D
N
j . After
listening to the public communication used in CAD, Eve
knows (X1, · · · , XN). As in the previous qubit case, she
applies the unitary operation:
UE =
d−1∑
m=0
d−1∑
l=0
e
2pii
d
Xjm[l,−m] (51)
This unitary operation transforms Eve’s states as follows,
U⊗NE :
N⊗
j=0
|eαj ,βj 〉 −→
N⊗
j=0
|es,s−(αj−βj)〉.
As above, this operation makes Alice, Bob and Eve’s
state independent of the specific vector used for CAD.
The resulting state reads
d−1∑
sA,sB=0
[sA, sB]AB ⊗ [esA,sB ]⊗NE , (52)
up to normalization. As above, the goal is to see when it
is possible to find a finite N such that the CCQ correla-
tions of state (52) provide a positive key-rate, according
to the bound of Eq. (7).
The new disturbances D′j, j = 1, . . . , d − 1, after the
CAD protocol are equal to
D′j =
DNj∑d−1
k=0D
N
k
≤
(
Dj
F
)N
, (53)
where, again, the last inequality tends to an equality sign
for large N . The mutual information between Alice and
Bob is
I(A : B) = log d+
FN
pok
log
FN
pok
+
d−1∑
j=1
D′j logD
′
j . (54)
For large N , this quantity tends to
I(A : B) = log d−N
(
Dm
F
)N
log
F
Dm
+O((
Dm
F
)N )
where Dm = maxj Dj for j ∈ {1, · · · , d− 1}.
Let us now compute Eve’s information. Again, since
Alice and Eve share a CQ channel, Eve’s information is
measured by the Holevo bound. For very large N , as
in the case of qubits, we can restrict the computation of
χ(A : E) to the cases where there are no errors between
Alice and Bob after CAD. So, Eve has to distinguish
between N copies of states |ek,k〉. Thus, in this limit,
χ(A : E) ≈ S(ρE), where
ρE =
1
d
∑
k
[e⊗Nk,k ]. (55)
Denote by Aη, with η = 0, . . . , d − 1, the eigenvalues of
ρE . As shown in Appendix III, one has
Aη =
1
d2
d−1∑
k=0
d−1∑
k′=0
e
2pii
d
η(k−k′ )〈ek|ek′ 〉N .
Decomposing the eigenvalueAη into the term with k = k
′
and with k 6= k′ , we can write Aη = (1 + X(N)η /d)/d,
where
X(N)η =
∑
k 6=k′
e
2pii
d
η(k−k′ )〈ek,k|ek′ ,k′ 〉N . (56)
Note that X
(N)
η is real since X
(N)
η = d2Aη − d and Aη
is real, and
∑d−1
η=0X
(N)
η = 0 because of normalization.
Moreover, X
(N)
η goes to zero when N increases. Using
the approximation log(1+x) ≈ x/ ln 2 valid when x≪ 1,
we have
χ(A : E) ≈ −
∑
η
Aη logAη
≈ log d− 1
d3 ln 2
d−1∑
η=0
X(N)η X
(N)
η
= log d− d− 1
d ln 2
∑
k 6=k′
|〈ek,k|ek′ ,k′ 〉|2N .
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As above, the security condition follows from the com-
parison of the exponential terms in the asymptotic ex-
pressions I(A : B) and χ(A : E), having
max
k 6=k′
|〈ek,k|ek′ ,k′ 〉|2 > maxj
Dj
F
. (57)
This formula constitutes the searched security condition
for generalized Bell diagonal states. Whenever (57) is
satisfied, there exists a finite N such that the secret-key
rate is positive. In the next section, we analyze the gen-
eralization of the previous attack for qubits to arbitrary
dimension.
B. Eavesdropping attack
We consider here the generalization of the previous
qubit attack to arbitrary dimension. Unfortunately, we
are unable to use this attack to prove the tightness of
the previously derived condition, namely Eq. (57), in
full generality. However, the techniques developed in this
section can be applied to standard protocols, such as the
2- and d + 1-bases protocol. There, thanks to the sym-
metries of the problem, we can prove the tightness of the
security condition.
The idea of the attack is the same as for the case of
qubits. As above, Eve measures after the CAD part of the
protocol. She first performs the d-outcome measurement
defined by the projectors
Meq =
∑
n
[0, n], Mj =
∑
n
[j, n], (58)
where j 6= 0. The outcomes of these measurement are de-
noted by rE . Using this measurement Eve can know in a
deterministic way the difference between Alice and Bob’s
measurement outcomes, sA and sB. If Eve obtains the
outcome corresponding to Meq, she knows the tripartite
state is (up to normalization)
d−1∑
x=0
[xx]AB ⊗ [exx]⊗NE . (59)
Now, in order to learn sA, she must discriminate between
the d pure states |exx〉⊗N . Due to the symmetry of these
states, the so-called square-root measurement(SRM) [45,
46] is optimal, in the sense that it minimizes the error
probability (see Appendix IV for more details). She then
guesses the right value of sA with probability
P successeq =
1
d2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
η
√∑
m
e2pii(ηm/d)〈em,m|e0,0〉N
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
d2
∣∣∣∣∣
d−1∑
η=0
√
1 + Y
(N)
η
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (60)
where
Y (N)η =
d−1∑
m=1
e
2pii
d
ηm〈em,m|e0,0〉N , (61)
Y
(N)
η being real. Note that Y
(N)
η tends to zero for large
N . The error probability reads ǫeq = 1− P successeq .
If Eve obtains the outcome corresponding to Mj after
the first measurement, she knows that the three parties
are in the state (up to normalization)
d−1∑
x=0
[x, x+ j]AB ⊗ [ex,x+j]⊗NE .
(62)
Eve again applies the SRM strategy, obtaining
P successj =
1
d2
∣∣∣∣∣
d−1∑
η=0
√
1 + Y
(j,N)
η
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (63)
where
Y (j,N)η =
d−1∑
m=1
e
2pii
d
ηm〈em,m+j|e0,j〉N , (64)
the associated error probability being ǫj = 1− P successj .
As a result of this measurement, Alice, Bob
and Eve share the tripartite probability distribution
P (sA, sB, (sE , rE)), where (sE , rE) represents Eve’s ran-
dom variables, rE (sE) being the result of the first (sec-
ond) measurement. For each value of rE , Eve knows the
difference between Alice and Bob’s symbol and the er-
ror in her guess for Alice’s symbol. It would be nice to
relate the distillation properties of this tripartite proba-
bility distribution to the derived security condition (57),
as we did in the qubit case. Unfortunately, we are at
present unable to establish this connection in full gener-
ality. Actually, we cannot exclude that there exists a gap
for some Bell diagonal states. However, as shown in the
next section, the considered attack turns out to be tight
when applied to standard protocols, such as the 2- and
d+ 1-bases protocols.
Let us conclude with a remark on the resources Eve
needs for this attack. After applying the same unitary
operation on each qudit, Eve stores her quantum states
in a quantum memory. After CAD, she measures her
corresponding block of N quantum states. Recall that in
the qubit case, Eve does not need any collective measure-
ment, since an adaptative individual measurement strat-
egy achieves the fidelity of the optimal collective mea-
surement [36]. In the case of arbitrary dimension, it is
unknown whether there exists an adaptative measure-
ment strategy achieving the optimal error probability, at
least asymptotically, when N copies of d symmetrically
distributed states are given [37].
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VIII. EXAMPLES : 2- AND (d+ 1)-BASES
PROTOCOLS IN HIGHER DIMENSIONS
We now apply the previous security condition to spe-
cific protocols with qudits, namely the so-called 2- and
(d+1)-bases protocols [16], which are the generalization
of the BB84 and the six-state protocols to higher dimen-
sion. In the first case, Alice and Bob measure in two
mutually unbiased bases, say computational and Fourier
transform, while in the second, the honest parties mea-
sure in the d+ 1 mutually unbiased bases [42].
The optimal cloning attack for these protocols gives a
Bell diagonal state (45). However, due to the symmetries
of the protocols, the coefficients cm,n, or pm,n, are such
that
c =

v x . . . x
x y . . . y
...
...
. . .
...
x y . . . y
 (65)
where the normalization condition implies v2 + 2(d −
1)x2 + (d − 1)2y2 = 1. For the d + 1-bases protocol,
which is more symmetric, one also has x = y.
The fidelity, that is, the probability that Alice and Bob
obtain the same outcome, is
F =
d−1∑
k=0
〈kk|ρAB|kk〉 = v2 + (d− 1)x2,
for all the bases used in the protocol. The errors dis-
tribute in a symmetric way, Dj = (1− F )/(d− 1) for all
j 6= 0. For the d + 1-bases protocol, and since we have
the extra constraint x = y, the coefficients cm,n read
c0,0 =
√
(d+ 1)F − 1
d
cm,n =
√
1− F
d(d− 1) for m,n 6= 0. (66)
In the 2-bases protocol, y is a free parameter that can
be optimized for each value of the error rate, D, and
depending on the reconciliation protocol. For instance, if
Eve’s goal is to optimize her classical mutual information,
the optimal interaction (1→ 1+1 cloning machine) gives
(see [16] for more details)
c0,0 = F
cm,0 = c0,n =
√
F (1− F )
d− 1 for m(n) 6= 0
cm,n =
1− F
d− 1 for m,n 6= 0. (67)
In a similar way as in the qubit case, this choice of coef-
ficients is not optimal when considering two-way recon-
ciliation protocols, as shown in the next lines.
A. Security bounds
Having introduced the details of the protocols for arbi-
trary d, we only have to substitute the expression of the
coefficients into the derived security condition. Because
of the symmetries of the problem, all disturbances Dj
and overlaps 〈em,m|e0,0〉 are equal, which means that the
security condition simply reads
|〈em,m|e0,0〉|2 > D
(d− 1)F . (68)
After patient algebra, one obtains the following security
bounds:
1. For (d+1)-bases protocol, positive key rate is pos-
sible if
D <
(d− 1)(2d+ 1−√5)
2(d2 + d− 1) (69)
The critical QBER for the 6-state protocol, 27.6%,
is easily recovered by taking d = 2. Recently, Chau
has derived a general security proof for the same
protocols in Ref. [40]. Our critical values are the
same as in his work.
2. For the 2-bases protocol, the critical disturbances
D are
D <
(d− 1)(4d− 1−√4d+ 1)
2d(4d− 3) (70)
The optimal attack, in the sense of minimizing the
critical error rate, is always obtained for y = 0, see
(65). The critical QBER for the BB84 protocol is
recovered when d = 2. These values coincide with
those obtained in [41] for 2-bases protocols.
Once again, there exists a gap between this security
condition and the entanglement limit. For instance, in
the case of d+ 1-bases protocols, the entanglement limit
coincides with the security condition against individual
attacks [43]
|〈ek,k|el,l〉| > D
(d− 1)F ,
which looks very similar to (68). Thus, there exists again
weakly entangling channel where we are unable to estab-
lish a secure key using a prepare and measure scheme.
B. Proof of tightness
Finally, for these protocols, and because of the sym-
metries, we are able to prove the tightness of the derived
security condition, under the considered reconciliation
techniques. The goal is to show that the probability dis-
tribution P (sA, sB, (sA, sE)), resulting from the attack
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FIG. 9: Comparison of the security bounds and the entan-
glement condition. The security condition against collective
attacks requires stronger correlation than the entanglement
limit. Again, there may exist some entangled states that are
useless for key distillation with the considered techniques.
described in section VII B, cannot be distilled using one-
way communication from Alice to Bob (the same can be
proven if the communication goes from Bob to Alice by
reversing the role of these parties).
In order to do that, we proceed as in the case of qubits.
Alice-Bob’s probability distribution is very simple: with
probability F their symbols agree, with probability Dj =
D/(d − 1) they differ by j. After CAD on blocks of N
symbols, the new fidelity between Alice and Bob is
FN =
FN
FN + (d− 1)
(
D
d−1
)N . (71)
One can see that, again, Eve’s error probability in guess-
ing Alice’s symbol is larger when there are no errors be-
tween the honest parties. As in the qubit case, Eve wors-
ens her guesses by adding randomness in all these cases
and forgets rE . After this process, she guesses correctly
Alice’s symbol with probability, see Eq. (60),
P successeq (N) =
1
d2
√1 + (d− 1)(v − x
F
)N
+ (d− 1)
√
1 +
(
v − x
F
)N2 , (72)
independently of Bob’s symbols. Here we used the fact
that 〈em,m|e0,0〉 = (v−x)/F whenm 6= 0 for the analyzed
protocols.
After Eve’s transformation, the one-way distillabil-
ity properties of the final tripartite probability distribu-
tion are simply governed by the errors, as in the qubit
case. Thus, we want to prove that at the point where
the security condition is no longer satisfied, i.e. when
((v − x)/F )2 = D/((d− 1)F ), one has
P successeq (N) > FN , (73)
for any block size N . Define t2 = D/((d − 1)F ), where
0 ≤ t ≤ 1 because F > 1/D. What we want to prove can
also be written as, see Eqs. (71) and (72),(√
1 + (d− 1)tN + (d− 1)
√
1 + tN
d
)2
>
1
1 + (d− 1)t2N ,
(74)
for all N and all d, where 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Actually, using that
0 ≤ t ≤ 1, it suffices to prove the case N = 1, since all the
remaining cases will follow by replacing tN → t and using
the condition for N = 1. After patient algebra, one can
show that (74) is satisfied for N = 1, which finishes the
proof. Therefore, for the considered protocols, the attack
introduced above breaks the security whenever our secu-
rity condition does not hold. Therefore, this condition is
tight for the considered reconciliation techniques.
IX. CONCLUSION
This works provides a general formalism for the secu-
rity analysis of prepare and measure schemes, using stan-
dard advantage distillation followed by one-way commu-
nication techniques. The main tools used in this formal-
ism are the de Finetti argument introduced by Renner
and known bounds on the key rate. We derive a sim-
ple sufficient condition for general security in the impor-
tant case of qubit Pauli channels. By providing a spe-
cific attack, we prove that the derived condition is tight.
When applied to standard protocols, such as BB84 and
six-state, our condition gives the critical error rates pre-
viously obtained by Chau. Since our condition is tight,
these critical error rates cannot be improved unless an-
other reconciliation technique is employed. Here, most
of our analysis focus on conditions for security. However,
the same techniques can be used to compute key rates.
Actually, our results imply that the critical error rates of
20% ad 27.6% for the BB84 and six-state protocols can
be reached without any pre-processing by Alice, contrary
to previous derivations by Chau [30] or Renner [15]. The
rates we obtain, then, are significantly larger. We then
extend the analysis to arbitrary dimension and gener-
alized Bell diagonal states. The corresponding security
condition can be applied to obtain critical error rates for
the 2- and d+1-bases protocols. For these protocols, we
can also prove the tightness of the condition.
We explore several possibilities to improve the ob-
tained security bounds. As shown here, pre-processing
by Alice or a coherent version of distillation by Bob do
not provide any improvement. This is of course far from
being an exhaustive analysis of all possibilities, but it sug-
gests that it may be hard, if not impossible, to get the
entanglement limit by a prepare and measure scheme. In
our opinion, this is the main open question that naturally
follows from our analysis. The easiest way of illustrating
this problem is by considering the simple qubit depolar-
izing channel of depolarizing probability 1− p. This is a
channel where the input state is unchanged with proba-
bility p and map into completely depolarized noise with
probability 1−p. The corresponding state is a two-qubit
Werner state. When p = 1/3, the channel is entangle-
ment breaking, that is, it does not allow to distribute
entanglement, so it is useless for any form of QKD. As
shown here, the same channel can be used to QKD using
a prepare and measure scheme when p > 1/
√
5. Triv-
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ially, the entanglement limit can be reached if one allows
coherent protocols by the two parties, such as entangle-
ment distillation. However, is there a prepare and mea-
sure scheme with positive key rate for 1/3 ≤ p < 1/√5?
X. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We thank Emili Bagan, Cyril Branciard, Barbara
Kraus, Llu´ıs Masanes, Ramo´n Mun˜oz-Tapia and Re-
nato Renner for useful discussion. This work is sup-
ported by the Spanish MEC, under a “Ramo´n y Cajal”
grant and FIS 2004-05639 project, and the Generalitat
de Catalunya, 2006FIR-000082 grant.
Appendix I. Cloning Based Attacks
Asymmetric cloning machines have been proven to be a
useful tool in the study of optimal eavesdropping attacks.
In a cryptographic scenario, the input state to the cloning
machine is the one sent by Alice, while one of the outputs
is forwarded by Eve to Bob, keeping the rest of the output
state. For instance, in the BB84 case, where Alice uses
states from the x and z bases, the optimal eavesdropping
attack is done by a 1 → 1 + 1 phase-covariant cloning
machine [44] that clones the xz equator. The output
states for Bob and Eve are
ρB =
1
2
(I + ηBxz(n
B
x σx + n
B
z σz) + η
B
y n
B
y σy)
ρE =
1
2
(I + ηExz(n
E
x σx + n
E
z σz) + η
E
y n
E
y σy),
where ηi are usually called the shrinking factors.
In the entanglement picture, this attack corresponds
to the Bell diagonal state
ρAB = λ1[Φ1] + λ[Φ2] + λ[Φ3] + λ4[Φ4].
Here λ2 = λ3 = λ, which implies that the error rate
is the same in both bases. The normalization condition
is λ1 + 2λ + λ4 = 1. When compared to the cloning
machine, the shrinking factor are ηBxz = λ1 − λ4 and
ηExz = 2
√
λ(
√
λ1 +
√
λ4). Note that η
B
y = 1 − 4λ + 4λ4
and ηEy = 2(λ+
√
λ4(1− 2λ− λ4)).
In the case of using one-way communication distillation
protocols, Eve’s goal is to maximize, for a given QBER,
her Holevo information with Alice (see Eq. (7)). The
optimal coefficients, or cloning attack, are λ1 = (1 −
Q)2, λ = Q − Q2, and λ4 = Q4, where Q is the QBER.
When considering two-way communication protocols, as
in this work, the security condition is given in Sec. IVA.
According to this condition, the optimal coefficients are
λ1 = 1− 2Q, λ = Q, and λ4 = 0.
Appendix II. Eve’s information in the case of
pre-processing
In this appendix, we show how to compute Eve’s in-
formation in the case Alice applies pre-processing before
the CAD protocol, for large blocks. In this limit, Eve is
faced with two possibilities, ρ⊗N0,0 and ρ
⊗N
1,1 , that read
ρ0,0 = u[e0,0] + v[e0,1]
ρ1,1 = u[e1,1] + v[e1,0] (75)
Indeed, if N ≫ 1, there are almost no errors in the sym-
bols accepted by Alice and Bob. Eve’s Holevo bound
then reads
χ(A : E) ≈ S(σE)−Nh(u), (76)
where we used the fact that S(ρ⊗N0,0 ) = S(ρ
⊗N
1,1 ) = Nh(u).
The main problem, then, consists of the diagonaliza-
tion of σE . Note however that the states ρ0,0 and ρ1,1
have rank two and their eigenvectors belong to different
two-dimensional subspaces. This implies that σE decom-
poses into two-dimensional subspaces that can be easily
diagonalized. The corresponding eigenvalues are
λr = u
rvN−r
1± |〈e0,0|e1,1〉|r|〈e0,1|e1,0〉|N−r
2
(77)
for r = 0, . . . , N , with degeneracy N !/(r!(N − r)!). Re-
placing these eigenvalues into the von Neumann entropy,
one gets
S(σE) = Nh(u) +
N∑
r=0
(
N
r
)
urvN−r
h
(
1 + |〈e0,0|e1,1〉|r|〈e0,1|e1,0〉|N−r
2
)
. (78)
For large N and nonzero u, the only relevant terms in the
previous sum are such that |〈e0,0|e1,1〉|r|〈e0,1|e1,0〉|N−r ≪
1. One can then approximate h((1+x)/2) ≈ 1−x2/ ln 4,
having
S(σE) ≈ Nh(u) + 1− (u|〈e0,0|e1,1〉|
2 + v|〈e0,1|e1,0〉|2)N
ln 4
,
(79)
where we used the binomial expansion. Collecting all the
terms, Eve’s information reads
χ(A : E) ≈ 1− (u|〈e0,0|e1,1〉|
2 + v|〈e0,1|e1,0〉|2)N
ln 4
. (80)
Appendix III. Properties of geometrically uniform
states
A set of d quantum states {|ψ0〉, ..., |ψd−1〉} is said to
be geometrically uniform if there is a unitary operator
U that transforms |ψj〉 into |ψj+1〉 for all j, where the
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indices read modulo d. All sets of geometrically uni-
form states, if the cardinality is the same, are isomorphic.
Therefore, we do not lose any generality when assuming
that those states are of the form:
|ψα〉 =
d−1∑
n=0
cne
2pii
d
nα|xn〉
where α runs from 0 to d − 1 and |xn〉 are orthonormal
basis. Each state |ψα〉 translates to |ψα+β〉 by applying
β times the unitary U =
∑d−1
m=0 e
2pii
d
m|xm〉〈xm|. These
states satisfy the following properties, that are used in
our computations:
• Given a set of geometrically uniform states
{|ψ0〉, ..., |ψd−1〉}, an orthonormal basis spanning
the support of those states can explicitly obtained
as follows:
|xn〉 = 1
dcn
∑
α
e−
2pii
d
nα|ψα〉. (81)
• The uniform mixture of geometrically uniform
states gives the orthogonal decomposition in the
basis defined above {|xn〉}:
ρ =
1
d
∑
α
|ψα〉〈ψα| =
∑
n
c2n|xn〉〈xn|.
Therefore, the eigenvalues of the equal mixture of geo-
metrically uniform state are c2n. Using (81), these eigen-
values can be written as:
c2n =
1
d2
∑
α,β
e
2pii
d
n(β−α)〈ψβ |ψα〉. (82)
In our case, we are interested in the eigenvalues of the
state
ρ =
1
d
∑
α
|eα〉〈eα|⊗N ,
which approximates Eve’s state after CAD in the limit of
large N . The states |eα〉⊗N are geometrically uniform,
so the searched eigenvalues are:
λµ =
1
d2
∑
α,β
e
2pii
d
µ(β−α)〈eβ |eα〉N .
Appendix IV. Square-Root Measurement(SRM)
We describe the so-called square-root measurement
along the lines given in Ref. [46]. Suppose that Alice
encodes a classical random variable i that can take l dif-
ferent values into a quantum state |φi〉 ∈ Cd, with l ≤ d,
and sends the state to Bob. Suppose the l states are
non-orthogonal and span an m dimensional subspace of
C
d
. Denote by Πm the projection into this subspace,
i.e. Πm|φi〉 = |φi〉 for all i. Bob has to read out the
encoded value from the quantum state in an “optimal”
way. There exist several “optimal” measurements de-
pending on the figure of merit to be optimized. Here,
following [46], we consider that Bob applies a measure-
ment consisting of l rank-one operators [mi], satisfying∑
i[mi] = Πm. The figure of merit to be optimized is the
squared error E =
∑l−1
i=0〈Ei|Ei〉, where |Ei〉 = |φi〉−|mi〉
are the error vectors. As shown in [46], the measurement
strategy minimizing E is the so-called SRM, also known
as pretty-good measurement. The construction of this
optimal measurement works as follows.
Denoted by Φ the matrix whose columns are |φi〉. The
SRM is constructed from the structure of the matrix Φ.
Applying singular value decomposition to Φ = UDV †,
the optimal measurement matrix is [46]
M =
∑
i
|ui〉〈vi|
where |ui〉 and |vi〉 are the column vectors of the two
unitary matrices U and V , respectively. Here the column
vectors of M define the optimal choice of measurement
projectors |mi〉.
Moving to our cryptography problem, the states Eve
has to discriminate are the geometrically uniform states
|eγ〉 =
d−1∑
n=0
βne
2pii(γn/d)|xn〉
where |xn〉 is an orthonormal basis in a d-dimensional
Hilbert space, and γ runs from 0 to d − 1. Each |eγ〉
is normalized. In our problem, Eve aims at minimiz-
ing her error probability. Interestingly, in the case of
geometrically uniform state, the previous measurement
strategy turns out to minimize the error probability as
well [46]. So, we only have to derive the optimal mea-
surement matrix from Φ =
∑
γ |eγ〉〈xγ |. Using relations
Φ†Φ = V DV †, the unitary V is the d-dimensional Fourier
transform F|xu〉 = 1√d
∑
w exp(− 2piid wu)|xw〉, and the
diagonal matrix is D = diag(
√
d|βn|). Therefore, the
optimal measurement matrix is
M =
∑
i
|mi〉〈xi|
where
|mj〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
e
2pii
d
jk|xk〉
Using this measurement, the probability of guessing
correctly a given state |ej〉 is |〈mj |ej〉|2. Then, the aver-
age success probability is
P success =
d−1∑
j=0
p(j) |〈mj |ej〉|2 = 1
d
∣∣∑
n
βn
∣∣2 (83)
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The last equality is obtained taking into account that all
|ej〉 are equally probable, p(j) = 1/d. In particular, for
the d + 1- or 2-bases protocols, the success probability
reads, in terms of v and z, P success = (v+(d−1)z)2/dF .
When N copies of the states are given, |ej〉⊗N , we can
apply a collective measurement strategy. The SRM is
constructed in the same way as above, and the success
probability, assuming that all states are equi-probable, is
P successN =
1
d2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
η
√∑
m
e2pii(ηm/d)〈em|e0〉N
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
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